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1912 DAILYLAW 1 (GUJ)

PATEL ASHVINBHAI BHAGVANJIBHAI LILA v. PATEL DHIRAJLAL VASTABHAI

CA/1912/2023 · 2026-08-07

Ilesh J Vora, R T Vachhani

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Judgment text

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C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 1912 of 2023 In F/FIRST APPEAL/31316/2023 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 2 of 2025 In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1912 of 2023 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1912 of 2023 ========================================================== PATEL ASHVINBHAI BHAGVANJIBHAI LILA & ANR. Versus PATEL DHIRAJLAL VASTABHAI & ORS. ========================================================== Appearance: DR. SHRENIK R JASANI(9486) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2 MR VIMAL A PUROHIT(5049) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2 MR. GAURAV A. GOGIA(14128) for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3,5,6,7 RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,4 ========================================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI Date : 07/08/2026 ORAL ORDER (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA) Order in Civil Application No. 2 of 2025: Looking to the averments made in the Civil Application, the delay in preferring the Civil Application for bringing the legal heirs is allowed. Civil Application is allowed. Order in Civil Application No. 1 of 2025: Looking to the averments made in the Civil Application, present Civil Application for bringing the heirs and legal representatives of C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 deceased respondent no.1 and 4 is allowed in terms of para-11(C). Learned advocate is permitted to amend the cause title accordingly. Order in Civil Application No. : 1912 of 2023: 1. This application is filed seeking condonation of delay in filing First Appeal. The delay of 475 days caused in preferring the captioned filed No.F/FA/31316 of 2023. 2. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the Appeal are set out as under: (1) The applicants had instituted Special Civil Suit No. 66 of 2010 in the Court of Civil Judge, Gondal at Rajkot for declaration, permanent injunction and specific performance of contract with regard to suit property. (2) The Civil Court vide its judgment and decree dated 26.07.2017 was pleased to dismiss the suit on merits. Admittedly, neither the plaintiff nor defendant had given an opportunity to led the evidence. The Civil Court based on the available documents in the form of xerox copies, decided the rights and liabilities of the parties, as if, the parties have led the evidence. No issues were framed. In such circumstances, the applicants being original plaintiffs, on advice, challenged the judgment of dismissal of the suit, filed a review petition on 19.08.2017, before the District Court, Gondal at Rajkot. The said Review Application came to be dismissed on 19.02.2021. The applicants herein, then approached this Court by way of First Appeal, challenging the judgment of C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 dismissal of suit, which came to be filed on 29.08.2023. However, there is a delay according to calculation made by the applicants of 475 days in preferring the Appeal. 3. The grounds of delay are explained as under : (a) That the judgment of dismissal of suit is against the provision of Code of Civil Procedure. No issues were framed by the Court. None of the parties had led their respective oral as well as documentary evidence. Thus, instead of dismissing the suit for want of prosecution, the Civil Court for reasons best known to him, decided the suit on merits, which directly affect the substantial rights of the applicants with respect to the suit property, as the respondents failed to execute the sale deed after getting substantial amount from the applicants herein. Thus, there is a merit in the appeal and opportunity should be given to decide the lis between the parties on merits. (b) The applicants had retained their advocate Mr. P. J. Gauda, who expired on 03.05.2015, since then the applicants were not aware about the pendency of the suit and its stage. (c) The applicants on advice, challenged the judgment by preferring Review Application and therefore, when the party was pursuing a wrong remedy, then as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period spent for pursing the review remedy from 29.08.2017 to 19.08.2021, is required to be excluded. Page 3 of 8 C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 (d) There was Corona period between 2019 to 2021. The Supreme Court suspended the period of limitation commencing from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. (e) The delay was not intentional and no negligence or inaction imputable on the part of the applicants. 4. In the aforesaid grounds, it is stated that the delay has been sufficiently explained and same may be condoned so as to do substantial justice. 5. Mr. Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel for Mr. Vimal Purohit, learned advocate for the applicants has submitted that there are chances in succeeding the appeal, as the respondents failed to perform their part so far as terms and agreement of the contract is concerned and now, due to escalation in price of the land, they turned hostile and refused to perform their part by executing sale deed of the suit land. The applicants were unaware about the death of their lawyer and therefore neither the court nor the son of the lawyer informed them about the dismissal of the suit. The approach of Civil Court is contrary to the settled law. The Court should not have dismissed the suit on merits without giving opportunity to the respective parties. The maximum time was consumed in review application proceedings and said proceedings was being filed bonafide and as per Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time consumed in pursuing the Review Application, could be excluded. The provision of the Limitation Act, being stayed during Corona period. In such circumstances, it was submitted that, the delay C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 cannot be said to be deliberate and considering the circumstances as referred above, the delay has been explained satisfactorily and therefore, it is prayed that, the technical approach may be avoided and the grounds, as referred shall have to be liberally construed to do substantial justice. 6. Mr. Anand Gogia, learned advocate for the respondent vehemently opposed the application. It was contended that, the applicants - original plaintiffs remained negligent and grounds for delay as referred are neither correct nor bonafide. The suit was instituted on 04.02.2010 and it came to be dismissed 26.07.2017. Against which, the Review Application was filed on 19.08.2017 and same came to be dismissed on 19.02.2021. Thereafter, after period of 2 years i.e. on 29.08.2023, the appeal along with present delay condonation application filed before this Court. Therefore, it is evident that, the applicants did remain negligent for about 7 years and there was gross negligence on their part and the explanation offered cannot be acceptable and convincing and as such, the explanation would not to be treated as ‘sufficient cause’ for condoning the delay. In support of the submissions, heavy reliance been placed in case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Chaudhary (2025 (2) GLR 987), to contend that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’, cannot be liberally interpreted, if the negligence, inaction or lack of bona-fides is attributed to the party and delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to opposite party. Page 5 of 8 C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the issue falls for our consideration, as to whether ‘sufficient cause’ existed for condoning the delay in filing the First Appeal? 8. In the facts of the present case, after dismissal of the suit, the time consumed in pursing the Review Application, whereby, the judgment was challenged required to be excluded, as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act because, the applicants had been bona-fide pursing the wrong remedy. Thus, the time period from 26.07.2017 to dismissal of the Review Application i.e. 19.02.2021, is required to be excluded in calculating the delay caused in preferring the First Appeal. Admittedly, during the pandemic time, the provision of Limitation Act being suspended, commencing w.e.f. 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. Thus, from the date of judgment of Review Application till 28.02.2022, the time period is required to be excluded. The actual delay would require to be calculated from 01.03.2022 to filing of First Appeal i.e. 29.08.2023, which would come to around 484 days. In such circumstance, whether the delay of 484 days caused in filing First Appeal, satisfactorily explained or not. 9. This delay application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which says that, any appeal or application, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant / applicant satisfies the court that he has ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. At the outset, it needs to be stated that, generally speaking the Courts have to adopt C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and Ors Vs. Katiji and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC 107). In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. Krishna Murthy 1998 (7) SCC 123, it has been reiterated by the Supreme Court that, rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. However, in the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu Vs. State of A.P, (AIR 2011 SC 1199), it was held and observed that, the Courts have to adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay but the concept of liberal approach, justice oriented approach and substantial justice, cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. In another case, the Supreme Court (State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ram Kumar Chaudhary (2025 (2) GLR 987) (supra), it was observed that, where the case has been presented beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the ‘sufficient cause’, which means, an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. The discretion to condone delay, has to be exercised judicially, based on the facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted, if the negligence, inaction or lack of bona-fide is attributed to the party. 10. In light of the settled principle of law and applying the same to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that, the C/CA/1912/2023 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 explanation offered for condonation of delay is found to be not satisfactory. The applicants in their application have not given any acceptable and genuine instances that, there was ‘sufficient cause’ preventing them to prefer the First Appeal. As pointed out, in preceding para-8 of the order, the applicants, were inactive and remained negligent. There was enough time to act promptly to file an appeal even after the pandemic period. But somehow, they could not approach this Court promptly with all due diligence, which shows that they slept over their rights without any justifiable reason. Thus, it shows that the applicants failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence or bona-fide in pursing their rights. Thus, therefore, in our opinion, the reasons set forth for the delay are totally insufficient to condone the delay and the explanation is no explanation much less sufficient or satisfactorily explanation, which can be said to constitute ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring an appeal within prescribed time period. 11. In view of the aforementioned reasons, the present application fails and is accordingly dismissed. Notice discharged. No order as to costs. (ILESH J. VORA,J) (R. T. VACHHANI, J) P.S. JOSHI Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges. Digitally signed by: PALLAV SUBHASHCHANDRA JOSHI(HC00177), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 07/08/2026 13:41:54